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Abstract:  The Canadian federal tax reform of 1988 replaced a spousal tax exemption 
with a non-refundable tax credit. This reduced the “jointness” of the tax system: after the 
reform, secondary earners’ effective “first dollar” marginal tax rates no longer depended 
on the marginal tax rates of their spouses. In practice, the effective “first dollar” marginal 
tax rates faced by women with high income husbands were particularly reduced. Using 
difference-in-difference estimators, we find a significant increase in labour force 
participation among women married to higher income husbands.   
JEL classifications: J22, H24 
Keywords: Labour Supply; Canadian Tax Reform; Married Women; Difference-in-
Difference.  
Résumé:  La réforme canadienne de l’impôt sur le revenu de 1988 a remplacé une 
exonération d'impôt pour le conjoint par un crédit d'impôts non-remboursable.  Cette 
dernière réduisit l’interdépendance du régime fiscal: après la réforme, le taux marginal 
effectif d'imposition du « premier dollar » des salariés secondaires n’était plus lié au taux 
marginal d'imposition de leurs conjoints.  Dans la pratique, le taux marginal effectif 
d'imposition du "premier dollar" des femmes dont les maris déclaraient des revenus 
élevés a été fortement diminué.  En utilisant des estimateurs de différence du deuxième 
degré, nous trouvons une augmentation significative de la participation au marché du 
travail des femmes dont les conjoints rapportent des revenus élevés. 
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The effect of income taxes on labour supply is a question of substantial interest to 
both policy makers and academics. Canadian income tax rates changed considerably 
during the late 80’s and early 90’s; however, the effects of Canadian personal income tax 
reforms on labour supply have not been widely studied, particularly in comparison to 
personal income tax reforms in the U.S.  This paper studies the effect of Canadian tax 
reform in 1988 on the labour supply of married women.    
In his book Taxing Women (1997), McCaffery argues that the U.S. tax system 
significantly distorts the labour supply decisions of women. The taxation unit in the U.S. 
is a household – there is joint filing. If some women are secondary earners in the family, 
the first dollar of earnings by those married women is effectively subject to high marginal 
tax rates determined by their husband’s income. Consequently, the joint filing limits 
married women’s entry into the labour force.
1 
While the Canadian income tax system is generally based on individual taxation, 
particular features of the tax code have at times created incentives similar to those 
provided by a system of joint taxation. Given the arguments of McCaffery and others, the 
Canadian tax reform of 1988 is particularly interesting because it reduced the “jointness” 
of the tax system facing couples in Canada. That is, it eliminated a connection between a 
secondary earners’ effective marginal tax rate and her (or his) spouse’s marginal income 
tax rate. A spousal exemption (tax deduction) was replaced with a non-refundable tax 
                                                 
1 The U.S. is among a small minority of developed countries with joint filing. Among the 
arguments for joint taxation is that it offers greater horizontal equity: two couples with 
the same income pay the same tax. Under a system of individual filing, the tax bill of the 
household depends on the how income is split between the couple.     
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credit.  The amount that can be claimed by the primary earner is in each case reduced as 
the secondary earner’s income rises. However, because the spousal exemption reduced 
taxable income, its value depended on the marginal tax rate of the primary earner and was 
much higher for high-income (and hence high marginal tax rate) husbands. Thus, prior to 
the reform, a secondary earner faced a “first dollar” marginal tax rate equal to the 
marginal tax rate equal to her spouse’s marginal tax rate (as is the case in a system of 
joint taxation.) This is not true with the tax credit – its value does not depend on the 
primary earner’s marginal tax rate. Thus the effect of the reform was to significantly 
reduce the “first dollar” marginal tax rate of women married to high-income husbands, 
while leaving the “first dollar” marginal tax rate of women married to low income 
husbands essentially unchanged. 
 In this study, we follow Eissa (1995, 1996) and employ a difference-in-difference 
strategy to study the effects of taxes on female labour supply.  Women married to high 
income men are the treated group, while women married to low income men form a 
control group. To implement our estimation strategy, we employ data from the Canadian 
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) for the years from 1986 to 1991. (The Canadian 
SCF is quite similar to the US March supplement to the CPS.) We focus on low education 
women, on the grounds that these women are most likely to be secondary earners. 
With these data and empirical strategy we find evidence that low education 
women married to higher income husbands increased their labour supply and labour force 
participation as a result of the Canadian federal tax reform in 1988. The estimated effect 
on participation rates is sizeable: 9 to 10 percentage points. The implication of our results    
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is that the “jointness” of tax systems may indeed be an important determinant of the 
labour supply of married women. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section gives further details 
on the Canadian tax reform of 1988 and particularly its effect on the tax rates facing 
married women. Section 3 places our study in the context of related literature. Section 4 
gives further details on our data and methods, and Section 5 presents our results. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. The Canadian Tax Reform of 1988 and Married Women 
The 1988 federal tax reforms in Canada made a number of changes to personal 
income tax and had a particular effect on the effective marginal income tax rates of 
married women. Prior to the reform, there were 10 tax brackets in the personal income 
tax schedule, with rates ranging from 6 to 34 percent. This was replaced with a schedule 
of only 3 brackets, with rates of 17, 26, and 29 percent.
2 The reform also converted 
personal exemptions and many tax items that were formerly deductible into non-
refundable tax credits.   
For our analysis, the key change was the replacement of personal exemptions for 
a dependent spouse and children with a personal non-refundable tax credit. Prior to 1988, 
a filing spouse (usually husband) was allowed to claim a spousal exemption, which acted 
to reduce his taxable income which, in turn, was taxed under the bracket related schedule 
of rates. Under this spousal exemption husbands could claim a maximum amount of 
$3700 in 1987. The exemption however was a decreasing function of the spouse’s 
                                                 
2 However, in the Canadian tax system, effective marginal tax rates are affected by the high-income surtax, 
the various claw backs of refundable tax credits, and transfer payments, so that effectively, the actual 
number of tax brackets is larger than three.     
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income in excess of a stated amount.  Thus, for each additional dollar the spouse earned, 
the husband’s taxable income was increased at a dollar, and this dollar was taxed at the 
husband’s marginal tax rate.   
After 1988 this spousal exemption was replaced by a non-refundable tax credit. 
Under the new rules, the maximum amount ($850) of the married or equivalent credit was 
reduced by 17 percent of the dependent spouse’s net income in excess of $500. This 
credit phased out to zero at an income level of $5500, at which point the dependent 
spouse had to file a separate return. As a result, under the current Canadian tax system, a 
lower-income spouse faces tax rates initially at the lowest bracket rate (17 percent in 
1988). In contrast, under the tax system prior to 1988, the effective marginal tax rate of 
the lower-income spouse was the same as the effective marginal income tax rate of the 
(higher income) tax-filing spouse. For women with high income husbands, this could be 
much higher than 17%.  
Hence, if prior to 1988, the husband’s marginal income tax rate was relatively 
high, his wife’s effective marginal tax rate was considerably reduced by the tax reform. 
On the other hand, if the husband’s marginal income tax rate was relatively low, the 
change in his wife’s effective marginal income tax rate after tax reform in 1988 was 
insignificant. Therefore, our strategy is to identify the impact of the federal tax reform in 
1988 on the labour supply decisions of dependent-married women as the difference 
between the change in labour supply of women who face large reductions in the effective 
marginal income tax rate (the treatment group) and the change in labour supply of women 
who face relatively small reductions in the effective marginal income tax rate (the control 
group).     
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The contrast we are exploiting is very clear in Figure 1. This figure shows the pre- 
and post-reform schedule of effective marginal tax rates facing two (simulated) married 
women who differ only in their husbands’ income (these schedules were calculated using 
the tax simulation program described in the appendix). The left hand side panel illustrates 
the marginal tax rates facing a woman whose husband has total annual income of 25,000 
in 1986 Canadian dollars (as we shall see below, this is very close to the mean husband’s 
earnings in our control group.) The right hand side panel shows the marginal tax rates of 
an otherwise identical woman whose husband has annual total income of 50,000 1986 
Canadian dollars (this is very close to the mean in our treatment group.)
 3 In both cases, 
the pre-reform (1986) schedule of effective marginal tax rates is given by the dashed line, 
and the post-reform (1989) schedule is given by the solid line. The woman with the high 
income husband (on the right) experienced a very substantial decrease in her “first dollar” 
effective marginal tax rate, and indeed a substantial reduction in her effective marginal 
tax rates up to about 5,000  1986 Canadian dollars. In contrast, the woman with the low 
income husband (on the left) experienced little change in her effective marginal tax rates 
over the same range of income. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
It is also worth noting that the contrast just described is the only significant 
difference in the way the reform impacted these two simulated women. Both experienced 
the same shift and reduction in the spike above 5,000 dollars that resulted from the abrupt 
withdrawal of provincial tax relief for low income families. In both panels, the reduction 
                                                 
3 The range of these figures – up to 25,000 1986 Canadian dollars in income – covers 
90% of the sample we use in estimation (married women with no more than a high school 
education.)      
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in the number of tax brackets is apparent. However, for both women, this results in very 
minor changes to the schedule of effective marginal tax rates.
4 
3. Related Literature 
There is a large literature on the effect of taxes on labour supply, including  
women’s labour supply (see for example, the survey by Blundell and MaCurdy, 1998). 
Among US studies of married women’s labour supply, Eissa (1995) uses the difference-
in-difference estimation method, treating the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) as a 
natural experiment.  Like us, she focuses particularly on the labour supply of women 
married to high income husbands. The TRA86 reduced the number of tax brackets from 
fourteen to two. The top marginal tax rate was lowered from 50 percent to 28 percent, 
and the marginal tax rates of lower brackets were changed relatively less. Her study 
compares the changes in labour supply of women married to higher income husbands to 
the changes in labour supply of women married to lower income husbands. She finds that 
TRA86 significantly increased the  labour supply of women married to higher income 
husbands relative to the labour supply of women married to lower income husbands. In 
addition, Eissa (1996) uses the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981 as a natural 
experiment to examine the labour supply of married women. The ERTA reduced 
marginal tax rates by 23 percent within each bracket over a period of three years: by 10 
percent in 1982, 10 percent in 1983 and 5 percent in 1984. For two - earner married 
couples, ERTA introduced a tax deduction equal to 10 percent of the income of the lower 
                                                 
4 The careful reader may notice that after the reform the control group – with low income 
husbands – faces slightly higher initial effective marginal tax rates than the treatment 
group. This is because of the phase out of a number of tax credits which are means tested 
on family income.     
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earning spouse as long as he or she earned less than $30,000. In this second study, she 
finds weak evidence that the labour force participation of upper income married women 
is responsive to taxes, and no significant evidence of an increase in labour supply (annual 
working hours) of upper income married women.  
The difference-in-difference estimation method is distinguished by its ability to 
estimate labour supply responses without complete and explicit modeling of the 
complicated budget sets. However, Essia’s studies have been criticized by Heckman 
(1996), Blundell and MaCurdy (1998) and Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998).
5 The 
main criticism is her use of husbands’ income as a “grouping variable” to assign women 
to treatment and control groups. The concern is that the husband’s income is not 
exogenous and may itself respond to the tax reform.  Some women may switch groups as 
a result of the tax reform, and such changes in group composition lead to biased estimates 
                                                 
5 Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998) develop grouping instrumental variable estimators 
to estimate labour supply models that account for the endogeneity of gross wages and 
other income, and study how tax policy reforms in the UK during the 1980's affected the 
labour supply of married women. These grouping estimators are extensions of the 
difference-in-difference estimation method because they allow the consideration of more 
than two time periods. These two methods are very similar in the context of using 
differential changes between groups to control for correlation between unobservable 
characteristics of individuals and treatment effects (tax effects) in estimation. The 
differencing removes the source of endogeneity for treatment effects. Blundell, Duncan 
and Meghir (1998) explicitly control for the endogeneity of post tax wages using 
grouping instruments; therefore, the differential changes of marginal wages between 
groups reflect both differential growth in real wages between groups and differential 
impacts of the tax reforms on these groups. On the other hand, Eissa does not explicitly 
include a wage variable as a control variable in the differnece-in-difference estimations of 
labour supply. Instead, she assumes there is no differential growth in real wages between 
the two groups during the pre and post tax reform periods. The key difference between 
these two studies is the way they define their groups. Eissa uses a distribution of the 
husband’s income as a grouping variable, which is criticized because it is also subject to 
tax changes. In contrast, Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998) use women’s level of 
education and age cohort as grouping variables, which are exogenous (independent) of 
tax reforms.    
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of the effects of the reform on labour supply behaviour. In spite of these criticisms we 
have adopted her identification strategy. In the next section we provide some justification 
for using the husband’s income to determine treatment and control groups in this study.  
While there is considerable research on married women’s labour supply, the 
literature on specifically on the effects of joint-taxation is sparse. It includes policy 
analyses, such as McCaffery (1997), as well as more formal theoretical analyses, as in 
Piggott and Whalley (1996) and Apps and Rees (1999). There is little empirical work.  
In one recent working paper, LaLumia (2005) uses 1940 and 1950 census data to 
study the U.S. switch to joint taxation in 1948. She finds a statistical significant but 
economically small reduction in the labour force participation of married women 
associated with the introduction of joint taxation (0.9-16 percentage points). While this is 
an important result, much has change since 1948, regarding women’s expectations of 
labour force participation and the labour market opportunities open to them. Thus, as the 
Canadian economy and labour market is broadly similar to the U.S. in many respects, the 
Canadian tax reform of 1988 offers a complimentary opportunity to study the effects of 
joint taxation in a setting that, while not contemporary, is closer to the current day.  
3. Data and methods  
In this study we employ data from the Canadian Survey of Consumer Finances 
(SCF) for the survey years from 1986 to 1987, and from 1990 to 1991 (the survey collects 
income information for the proceeding year, so the actual reference years are from 1985 
to 1986 and from 1989 to 1990).
6  Our data are constructed from both the census family 
                                                 
6 The SCF was collected by Statistics Canada from 1970 to 1996 and was a cross 
sectional data series which used a different random sample of individuals each year.  In    
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(i.e., household) files and individual files of the SCF. First, from the census family files, 
we select married women, whose ages are between 20 and 64 and whose husband is 
present and is a paid employee in the reference years. We exclude women who are self 
employed, ill or disabled, attending school, or whose income is the primary income for 
the family. Also we exclude women residing in Quebec because Quebec imposes its 
provincial income tax separately, complicating the calculation of marginal tax rates. The 
resulting sample contains 22,473 women. The census family files do not contain 
information on women’s working hours. Thus, as the next step, we combine individual 
files from the SCF with the census family files using key files provided by Statistics 
Canada.  
Arguments that joint taxation has large effects on the labour supply of married 
women usually invoke a “chauvinist” model of married women’s labour supply in which 
the female partner, as secondary earner, conditions her labour supply choice on that of 
her husband and hence treats her husband’s income as unearned income. In makes sense, 
therefore, to focus this study on married women for whom this model is most likely to 
                                                                                                                                                   
the mid 1990s, this survey was replaced by the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics 
(SLID), a longitudinal series which followed the same individuals for several years.    
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apply.
7 For that reason, we restrict the sample to married women having a level of 
education of no more than high school. Our final sample includes 12,719 women.
8 
As noted above, we use total income of the husband to select the treatment and 
control groups. In each year, the treatment group is made up of married women whose 
husband’s income is between the 85
th and 99
th percentile of all husbands’ incomes (for 
that year). The 1,605 women in this group are characterized by having husbands whose 
total income averaged 53,273 1986 Canadian dollars. Then, we choose the control group 
in the following manner. First, these women must be at a point in the distribution of 
husbands’ incomes far enough below the high income group that their marginal income 
tax rate does not fall by as much as the marginal income tax rates of women in the high 
income group. Second, these women cannot be so far down the husband’s income 
distribution that they are fundamentally different from women in the treatment group in 
some unobservable way.
9 On the basis of these considerations, we chose a control group 
of women whose husband’s income is between the 21
st and the 35
th percentile of the 
                                                 
7 We are certainly not asserting that this is the “correct” model of household labor supply, 
and our empirical analysis should in no way be construed as test of that proposition. Our 
purpose here is simply to assess empirically the impact of tax changes on the married 
woman’s labor supply. Moreover, the set of labor supply models in which a switch from 
joint to individual taxation could be expected to impact female labor supply is of course 
much broader - for example, collective household models make an efficiency assumption 
which would preclude a failure to minimize joint tax liabilities. The “chauvinist” model 
connects us to the existing literature, is easily understood, and provides a useful focus and 
motivation for our empirical analysis.     
8 In our pre-reform data, we calculate that 52 percent of married women with less than 
high school qualified for joint-filing (in the sense that their husband could claim that 
spousal exemption). The corresponding numbers for high school graduates was 37 
percent and for those with more than high school, 26 percent. 
9 Of course our difference-in-difference estimation strategy will handle time invariant 
unobservable differences – our concern here is with the plausibility of the “common 
trends” assumption that underlies the difference-in-difference estimator. Note that since 
we exclude women with more than a high school education, it seems likely that there is 
less variation in unobservable characteristics than in an overall sample of women.    
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husbands’ income distribution. 1,607 women belong to this control group, and the 
average total income of their husbands is 24,568 1986 Canadian dollars. The summary 
statistics for the two groups are presented in Table 1. Women in the control group tend to 
be younger, less educated, and have more children under age 7. Also they tend to work 
more than the treatment group (participation, weeks and hours). 
[Table 1 about here] 
Turning to estimation, the following conceptual table of labour supply measures 
of each group before and after the tax reform motivates the difference-in-difference 
estimator.  (Our labor supply measures will include participation or average annual 
working hours and annual weeks worked.) 
  Before 1988 tax reform  After 1988 tax reform 
Control group  Hcb H ca 
Treatment group  Htb H ta 
 
The changes in labor supply by women married to a higher income husband are (Htb - 
Hta). Part of this change is due to the tax reform, and part is due to extraneous factors 
such as changes in labour demand. The assumption is that women married to a lower 
income husband (the control group) reflect these non-tax factors in the change their labor 
supply, given by (Hcb - Hca). This is the “common trends” assumption that underlies the 
difference-in-difference estimator. Thus an estimate of the effect of the tax reform on the 
labor supply of women in the treatment group is (Htb - Hta) - (Hcb - Hca). In words, we 
compare the labor supply growth of women who faced significant tax rate reductions to 
that of married women who experienced smaller (or no) tax rate reductions, under the    
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assumption that in the absence of the tax reform they would have experienced the same 
change in labor supply.  
  Our analysis is based on the contrast described above and illustrated for two 
synthetic married women in Figure 1. Before proceeding to estimation of labor supply 
responses it is useful to quantify the differences in tax changes actually experienced by 
our treatment and control groups. Table 2 quantifies the differences in the tax schedule 
facing our treatment and control group, before and after the tax reform. In each case, we 
use only the pre-reform sample of working married women, and use our tax calculator to 
calculate marginal tax rates for these women, and the average tax rate of their husbands, 
under alternative tax scenarios. In the first column of panel a) we present estimates – for 
both treatment and control group – average pre-reform marginal tax rates at actual 
reported income; these then are our estimates of their actual marginal tax rates. In the 
second column of panel a), we report estimates of their (counter-factual) marginal tax 
rates at the same income (adjusted for inflation) if they had faced the post-reform tax 
schedule. The third column gives the difference in the average marginal tax rate for 
treatments and for controls. Finally, the fourth column reports the difference-in-
difference in marginal tax rates. The table illustrates a small but statistical significant 
(about 2 percentage points) decrease in marginal tax rates for our treatments, both 
absolutely and relative to controls.  
  However, these are working women. As Figure 1 illustrated, the principal effect 
of the tax reform was not to lower their marginal tax rates across the entire schedule, but 
rather to lower their “first dollar” marginal tax rate (by uncoupling it from their husbands 
marginal tax rate). We put “first dollar” in quotes because, in fact, both before and after    
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the reform the marginal tax rate on the absolute first dollar of income was zero, because 
of a small personal exemption. What we really mean, of course, is the initial marginal tax 
rate facing a woman who enters the labour market in a nontrivial way.  
[Table 2 about here] 
To quantify this effect, we repeat the calculations of panel a), but at an income 
(for all women) of 1000$ (in 1986 dollars). The calculations are reported in panel b) of 
Table 2. The average fall in the “1000
th dollar” marginal tax rate is about seventeen 
percentage points, which is a very large change. 
Finally, the replacement of the spousal exemption with a nonrefundable tax credit 
raised the average tax rates of husbands. For working married women behaving as 
secondary earners, this amounts to a loss in unearned income, which in turn should have 
an income effect on labour supply. Panel c) of Table 2 shows that there was in fact an 
increase in the average tax rates of the husbands of the women in our pre-reform 
treatment sample, but that it is quite small (about one percentage point.)   
Regarding the difference-in-difference estimator, there are several concerns 
related to group identification. The first concern raised is finding an exogenous grouping 
variable. In spite of Heckman’s criticisms of Eissa’s approach, which are summarized in 
the previous section, we use the husband’s total income as a grouping variable. There are 
several justifications for using the husband’s income distribution to choose the treatment 
and control groups here. First, in their study of the impact of the 1988 Canadian tax 
reform,  Sillamaa and Veall (2001) find that taxable income (including capital income) is    
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substantially less responsive to tax changes in Canada than in the U.S.
10 Sillamaa and 
Veall (2001) do find evidence of a much higher tax response in self-employment income. 
Thus, we have excluded from our sample those married women having self-employed 
husbands, and have only kept women whose major source of total family income is 
wages and salaries.  
 Second, we use a wide income band from the husbands’ income distribution to 
choose treatment and control groups to reduce the potential for changes in group 
composition across the tax reform.
11 (In addition, the use of a wide band of the income 
distribution for control and treatment groups ensures that are enough observations in each 
group to produce precise estimates.) 
The second concern regarding the identifying assumptions is that there are no 
contemporary shocks to the relative labour market outcomes over the period of the tax 
reforms. This includes both no relative demand and no relative supply shocks. For 
example, if there is a difference in wage growth between the treatment and control 
groups, the difference-in-difference estimates will be biased. And it is certainly possible 
that the wage growth rates of higher and lower educated women differed over the study 
                                                 
10 They use similar methods to those applied by Auten and Carroll (1999) in the study of 
the effects of the TRA86 in the US. In contrast to the findings of Sillamaa and Veall, 
Auten and Carroll find both tax rates and non-tax factors appear to have had significant 
effects on relative income growth in the US during the late 1980s. 
11 Also we test using the husband’s education as a grouping variable since individuals 
with a high level of education (more than high school) likely earn higher income, and 
accordingly have a high marginal tax rate in the pre tax reform period. Therefore, we 
identify dependent-married women who have a high marginal tax rate in the pre tax 
reform period as those having a husband with a higher level of education. However, the 
difference in changes in average marginal tax rates between women married to a higher 
educated husband and women married to a lower educated husband are not statistically 
significant – husband’s education is here a weak instrument. One possible reason is that 
we have insufficient detail regarding husband’s education in the data.    
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period. However, our sample includes only women a high school education or less. 
Therefore, our analysis has less chance of being biased in this way than studies that 
include women of all different levels of education (such as Eissa 1995, 1996.)  
A third (and related) concern regarding the difference-in-difference estimator is 
that the treatment and the control groups may differ in time trends of either observable or 
unobservable characteristics or both.
12 Any bias due to differential changes in observable 
characteristics between the treatment and control groups is reduced in a regression 
adjusted difference-in-difference approach by controlling for relevant factors (Meyer 
1995).  Further, conditioning on additional explanatory variables via a regression 
adjustment will result in an efficiency improvement over estimates obtained by a simple 
difference-in-difference approach (Meyer 1995). Thus we augment our basic difference-
in-difference estimates with estimates regression-adjusted difference-in-difference 
estimates.  
First, we estimate a probit model analyzing the binary choice of whether or not to 
participate in the labour force. Next, we estimate both an annual working hours equation 
and an annual weeks worked equation on the sample of women who are working.  To 
control for sample selection bias in the estimation of these labour supply equations, we 
include an inversed Mills’ ratio calculated from the participation probit. 
13 The 
participation and the labour supply equations are specified as:  
 
                                                 
12 Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) also argue that given the increasing dispersion of 
incomes and wages among all groups during the study period of Eissa (1995), the 
common time effects (common trends) assumption among the unobservable components 
across the treatment and control groups may not be satisfied. 
13 As we have only one tax reform, we effectively have a single instrument, and the 
selection correction is identified by nonlinearities.    
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where labour force participation (LFP) is a latent variable that equals one if an individual 
is a participant,
14 Xit  is a set of demographic variables including age, age squared, the 
number of preschool children dummies, level of education dummies, and provincial 
dummies. ‘ _ hdtinc h’ is a dummy equal to one for women in the treatment group. Any 
differences in labour supply preferences across the treatment and the control group are 
reflected in the coefficients 2 β  and 2 α , in the labour force participation probit and labour 
supply equations respectively. Both  2 β  and  2 α are expected to be negative, because 
higher income women have more leisure than their lower income counterparts. The 
variable ‘time’, is equal to one for the post tax reform period. Its coefficients 3 β  and 
3 α are both expected to be positive because participation and labour supply are generally 
increasing over time. To test the impact of the federal tax reform of 1988, one only needs 
to test whether dependent-married women with a higher income spouse increased their 
labour supply (relative to women married to a low income spouse) after the federal tax 
reform. If  4 β  and  4 α are both positive, then the tax reform had a positive impact on 
labour force participation and labour supply respectively.  This would show that the tax 
reform’s lessening of the joint relationship between the effective marginal income tax 
rate of dependent-married women and of their husbands is a significant factor in a wife’s 
labour supply decision.  
                                                 
14 This does not include continuously unemployed married women. We redefined 
participation as having at least one week of work in the reference year.    
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4. Results 
Simple Difference-in-Difference Estimates 
 
  Table 3 reports the basic difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of the tax 
reform on both the labour force participation and the labour supply of married women. 
Panel a) compares the changes in the labour force participation of married women with 
husbands at higher income percentiles and married women with husbands at lower 
income percentiles, before and after the tax reform. The labor force participation rate of 
the women in the treatment group increases significantly, both relative to the control 
group and absolutely. The difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of the tax reform 
on the labor force participation rate of these women is an economically and statistically 
significant increase of 10 percentage points. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Although the primary effect of the tax reform was on the initial (or “first dollar”) 
marginal tax rate of women in the treatment group, and this should principally affect 
labour supply on the participation margin, we also examine weeks worked in the 
reference year and annual total hours of work for employed married women.
15 These 
calculations are reported in Panels b) and c) of Table 3. In both cases difference-in-
difference estimate of the effect of the tax reform is positive but not statistically 
significant.  
Regression adjusted Difference-in-Difference Estimates 
                                                 
15 The participation results suggest that more women are entering the labour force during 
this period. Because these women may be different than women in the labour force prior 
to tax reform, the population of working women in pre and post the tax reform may not 
be directly comparable.    
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  Turning to the regression results, we first present estimates of the labour force 
participation equation in Table 4. As expected, the number of preschool children reduces 
the probability of labor force participation, and more educated women are more likely to 
participate in the labor force. The treatment (married to high-income husbands) dummy is 
significantly negative. The time dummy is positive but not significant.
16 The coefficient 
on the interaction of time and high income (which captures the effect of the tax reform) is 
positive and statistically significant at a 1% significance level.  
[Table 4 about here] 
To turn this Probit coefficient into an interpretable magnitude, we calculate the 
average treatment effect on the treated (the marginal effect averaged over the treatment 
group.) There are two ways to do this (see Blundell et al., 2004.) ATET1 is the average 
treatment effect on the treated given that the difference-in-difference assumption 
(common trends) holds for actual probabilities. ATET2 is the average treatment effect on 
the treated given that the difference-in- difference assumption holds for the latent index in 
the Probit. Both numbers, with bootstrapped standard errors, are reported in Table 5, 
along side the simple difference-in-difference estimate. The message of this table is that 
neither regression adjustment nor the method of calculating marginal effects matters very 
much. All three calculations indicate a statistically and economically significant increase 
in labor force participation of about 10 percentage points.   
[Table 5 about here] 
Robustness and Placebo Tests 
We now report several checks on these results. Table 6.1 summarizes a number of 
robustness tests. In particular, we re-estimate the labor force participation probit on three 
                                                 
16 There is sustained growth in the labour force participation of Canadian women during 
the 1970s and 1980s. For women aged 25-64 the labour force participation rate increased 
from less than 50 percent in the mid 1970s to 70 percent in the late 1980s. Then women’s 
labour force participation rate remains around 75% throughout the 1990s (see Beaudry 
and Lemieux (1999) and Chaykowski and Powell (1999)).     
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alternative estimation samples. First, we delete from our original sample of married 
women with a high school education or less, those who are not high school graduates.  
Second, we use only the 1987 and 1990 data for our “before” and “after” samples. Third, 
we redefine the treatment group to be women whose husbands are between the 81
st and 
95
th percentile of the husbands’ income distribution (this treatment group has somewhat 
lower incomes than our baseline treatment group.) In each case we report ATET1 and 
ATET2 (averages of the marginal effect of the tax reform) and associated bootstrapped 
standard errors. In every case the estimate of the effect of tax reform on labor force 
participation among our treatment group remains positive and economically and 
statistically significant. The estimates rage from 7 to 9 percentage points.  
[Table 6.1 about here] 
Table 6.2 reports the results of two “placebo tests”. Ideally, we would like to have 
long period both before and after the reform for which we had data, and during which 
there were no policy reforms. A discrete change in the difference in labor force 
participation rates of the treatment and control group coincident with the reform – and at 
no other time – would be convincing evidence that we are identifying the effect of the 
reform. Unfortunately, we are limited in two ways. First, because of the limited 
availability of key files that link the individual and family files of the SCF (and hence 
link woman’s labor supply measures to husband’s income) we cannot extend our data 
series very far before the reform. Second, if we extend our data series much farther after 
the reform we encounter subsequent policy changes that may well have affected the labor 
force participation of married women.    
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The best we can do is to calculate on difference-in-difference estimates on our 
two pre-reform years (1987 versus 1986) and on our two post-reform years (1991 versus 
1990).  In both instances we expect to find no effect – because neither of these 
comparisons spans a policy change (if we did find an affect, it would challenge the 
common trends assumption that is the basis of our empirical strategy.) Reassuringly, we 
do not in either case find an effect. 
[Table 6.2 about here] 
Weeks and Hours Worked 
Finally, we report linear regression adjusted difference-in-difference estimates of 
the effect of the tax reform on weeks and hours worked by these (lower education) 
married women.  
Table 7 shows the results for weeks worked in the reference year (conditional on 
having worked at least one week). The coefficient of time is positive, the treatment group 
dummy is negative and the interaction between time and treatment (which captures the 
effect of the reform) is positive, but none of these is significant.  
Table 8 shows the results for annual total hours of work (conditional on having 
worked in at least one week). Having more pre-school children significantly reduces the 
annual total hours worked by married women. Among the low education married women 
in our sample, total hours of work is significantly higher for high school graduates. 
Adding these controls increases both the size and significance of the interaction between 
treatment and the post-reform period. Across the reform, women in the treatment group 
increased their annual working hours by 175 hours relative to the women in the control 
group, and this difference-in-difference is statistically significant at a 10% level.    
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Nevertheless, regression adjustment does not change the result that by far most 
significant effect of the tax reform on the married women in our treatment group was on 
the participation margin. This is unsurprising, given that the principal effect of the reform 
was to lower the “first-dollar” effective marginal tax rates of this group.  
5. Conclusions 
  In this paper, we use difference-in-difference estimators to examine the impacts of 
the Canadian federal tax reform on1988 on the labour supply of married women. We 
focus on those with lower education, who are more likely to behave as secondary earners 
in their households. The federal tax reform in 1988 is interesting as a ‘natural experiment’ 
because it eliminated the connection between a married woman’s effective “first dollar” 
marginal tax rate and her husband’s income. Before the reform, a married woman 
secondary earner faced a “first dollar” marginal tax rate that was the “last dollar” 
marginal tax rate her husband. After the reform, this was not the case. Thus, for these 
women, the reform simulated a switch from joint to individual taxation.  
We compare the labour supply of a treatment group of women married to higher 
income husbands to the labour supply of a control group of women married to lower 
income husbands. We calculate that the treatment group experienced an average 
reduction in their effective “first dollar” marginal tax rate of 17 percentage points, which 
is a very large change. The average effective “first dollar” marginal tax rate of the control 
group was essentially unchanged.  
We find that the reform resulted in a 9 -10 percentage point increase in the labour 
force participation of low education women married to higher income husbands. This 
estimate is both economically and statistically significant, and robust to a number of    
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specification checks. Regression adjusted difference-in-difference estimates also suggest 
a small positive effect on annual working hours.  
The implication of our results is that “jointness” of tax systems may indeed be an 
important determinant of the labour supply of married women, particularly with those 
with lower education, and particularly on the participation margin. This result is of 
obvious interest for countries – such as the United States – with joint taxation. It should 
also be of interest for a number of developed countries where the unit of taxation is the 
individual, but where recent trends towards means testing benefits and tax credits on 
family income have increased the “jointness” of the tax the system.     
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Appendix 
Taxpayers' effective marginal income tax rates differ from their statutory marginal 
income tax rates. Macnaughton, Matthews and Pittman (1998)
17 report that in Canada, 
there are nineteen separate sources of differences between effective and statutory 
marginal tax rates, and 56 percent of the population experiences at least some difference 
between effective and statutory marginal tax rates. More than one-fifth of the population 
has at least a ten percentage point difference between the effective and statutory tax rates. 
Also, they mention that high effective tax rates are concentrated in the lowest federal 
statutory rate bracket (17 percent). In fact more taxpayers with effective rates above 45 
percent come from this bracket than from the supposedly top bracket of 31.32 percent. 
For the purposes of this and other work, one of us (Jeon, 2003) has developed a 
simulation model which calculates effective marginal income tax rates for Canada. This 
simulation model is distinguished from a similar application by Statistics Canada 
(SPSD/M) because of its ability to calculate the effective marginal tax rates of married 
women, including and especially, dependent tax filing spouses. This program is 
implemented in STATA. It was designed for use with Survey of Consumer Finances 
(SCF) data files but it is also compatible with other micro data sets such as the Family 
                                                 
17 Macnaughton, Matthews and Pittman (1998) use the Social Policy Simulation Database 
and Model (SPSD/M), which is a database of personal income tax returns and other 
financial data on individuals which contains a software facility enabling the user to 
simulate the revenue and income distribution effects of changes to tax laws and 
provincial and federal social programs such as employment insurance. However, to 
protect confidentiality, the individuals represented on the SPSD/M are synthetic in the 
sense that they are composites of several similar individuals. Since it has not been 
originally designed for calculating marginal tax rates, there are certain difficulties 
associated with calculating the effective marginal tax rates. In addition, this simulation 
model is not comparable with other micro survey data.    
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Expenditure Survey (FAMEX),
18 and the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics 
(SLID).
19  
This tax simulation model calculates federal and provincial tax liabilities and 
effective marginal income tax rates for single male and female taxpayers with or without 
children, as well as for married male and female taxpayers with or without children. 
These computations reflect the provisions of the federal and provincial income tax 
legislation as follows: 
1)  The Federal and Provincial Tax payable are computed using the rate schedules 
published in “The National Finances” and “Preparing your income tax returns”. 
2)  Total income is assumed to be from either Canadian employment or Canadian 
taxable government transfers. Deductions are taken for CPP or QPP and UI 
premiums (credits are used where applicable). 
3)  For the Federal Child Tax Credit, family total income is defined as respondents' 
total income plus their spouses’ total income. It is assumed that children under 16 
(or 18 - whichever information is available in the data: SCF) have no income; 
therefore, the full tax savings is assigned to these children. 
4)  Because a refundable sales tax credit was introduced in 1986 and the GST credit 
was introduced in 1991, these values were reflected in the tax simulation model. 
5)  Provincial rates are levied as a percentage of federal rates with special flat taxes, 
surtaxes and low income deductions/reductions. In addition, certain tax credits 
                                                 
18 FAMEX contains reported data by survey respondents like the SCF; therefore, all 
information (variables) are from corresponding questions on the survey. There are several 
tax related variables in FAMEX: income before tax, income after tax, personal taxes (this 
is income tax in each year) and provincial tax credits.  
19 In the SLID there are two sources of income data, which depend on each respondent’s 
preferences. Respondents can either report income sources during the interview or grant 
their permission for Statistics Canada to access their tax file data from Revenue Canada 
for purposes of the survey. In effect, well over half of SLID’s income data come directly 
from Revenue Canada (Statistics Canada Working paper No. 94-11 “The Use of Tax File 
Data in the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics: Summary Report”). In SLID, there 
are various variables related to income and tax information such as income tax (federal 
+provincial), federal income tax, provincial income tax, CPP/QPP, Child Tax Benefit, 
GST, etc. Also, when non-response occurs, certain types of data are imputed. Federal and 
provincial taxes payable are imputed using linear regression analysis, and the Child Tax 
Benefit and GST are imputed based on respondents’ characteristics.    
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issued by the provinces such as Cost Of Living Credits, and Provincial Sales Tax 
Credits are reflected in the program’s calculations. 
The program does have certain limitations. In particular, it is not well suited to 
calculating marginal tax rates of the self-employed, or those whose main income source 
is capital income. It is most suitable for calculating effective marginal tax rates of 
taxpayers whose main income source is employment income (wage and salaries)    
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Fig. 1: Married Women’s Effective Marginal Tax Rates, 


































Additional Details: All calculations are for a married woman from Ontario with one child under 7. She  is under 65 years of age,
has no pension income or disability, is not paying tuition or pursuing further education, has medical expenses less than 3% of net 
income, has no charitable or similar donations and no foreign taxes paid or participation in tax-favored investments. Federal and 
provincial income taxes are included with all applicable surtaxes and reliefs. Unemployment Insurance and Canada Pension Plan 
premiums are also included as taxes.    
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Table 1: Sample Characteristics,  
Married Women, High School Education or Less, 
Canadian Survey of Consumer Finances, 1986, ‘87, ‘90 and ‘91 (Pooled) 








Age (years)  35.1 (0.2) 37.9 (0.2) 
Pre-school children (%)  70.0 (2.2) 58.0 (2.1) 
High School Graduate (%)  52.3 (1.2) 67.7 (1.2) 
Total income (1986 $)  9008 (193) 10552 (288) 
Total wages (1986 $)  8021 (188) 9783 (278) 
Weeks worked (annual)  32.5 (0.6) 29.8 (0.6) 
Weekly usual hours worked  23.2 (0.4) 20.5 (0.4) 
Labor force participation (%)  0.71 (0.01) 0.65 (0.01) 
    
Husband high school graduate (but no more) (%)  28.1 (1.1) 30.4  (1.1) 
Husband educated beyond high school (%)  26.0 (1.1) 44.4  (1.2) 
Husband’s total income  (1986 $)  24568 (37) 53273 (195) 
    
Observations  1607 1605 
 
Notes:  
1.  All incomes and wages are in 1986 Canadian dollars. Note that incomes refer to 
the previous year: for the 1986 survey, conducted in early 1986, the income refers 
to the previous calendar year (1985). 
2.  The control group consists of married women whose husbands are between the 
21
st and 35
th percentile of the men’s income distribution. The treatment group 
consists of married women whose husbands are between the 85
th and 99
th 
percentile of the men’s income distribution.     
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Table 2: Effective Marginal and Average Income Tax Rates 
Mean (or difference in Means or Difference-in Difference in Means) 
(Standard error) 
 
a)  Married women’s effective total marginal income tax rates at actual pre-reform 
earnings 
 







0.279 0.279 0.000    Control 
(Low income husband)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)   
0.293 0.275    -0.017***  -0.017**  Treatment  
(High income husband)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)  (0.007) 
 
b) Married Women’s effective total marginal income tax rates at earnings of $1000 
 







0.297  0.302      0.004**    Control 
(Low income husband)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)   
0.444 0.273  -0.171***  -0.175***  Treatment 
(High income husband)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.003) 
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c) Husbands’ average income tax rates (at wives’ actual pre-reform income) 
 







0.178  0.182        0.004*    Control 
(Low income husband)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)   
0.256  0.275   0.019***   0.014***  Treatment 
(High income husband)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.004) 
 
Notes:  
1.  Average and marginal tax rates are calculated for women working positive hours 
in the pre-reform data. The simulation model (see appendix) is used to calculate 
effective marginal tax rates and husbands’ average tax rates. Both the pre- and 
post reform tax rules were applied to the same women (drawn from the pre-reform 
data.) Calculations were conducted both at observed earnings and at 1000$ of 
earnings.  
2.  *** significantly different from zero at less than a 1% significance level (for a 
two tail test); **   5% significance level; * 10% significance level. 
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Table 3: Simple Difference-in-Difference Estimates 
Mean (or difference in Means or Difference-in Difference in Means) 
(standard error) 
 
a) Labour force participation 
Group  Pre tax reform  Post tax reform  Difference  
Difference in 
Difference 
0.710 0.709 -0.001    Control 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.023)   
0.602  0.700   0.099***   0.100***  Treatment 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.024) (0.033) 
 
b) Working weeks in the reference year  (conditional on positive weeks) 
Group  Pre tax reform  Post tax reform  Difference  
Difference in 
Difference 
45.0   46.8     1.7**    Control 
(0.5) (0.5) (0.7)   
44.9  47.5    2.5***  0.8  Treatment 
(0.6) (0.5) (0.8) (1.1) 
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c) Annual total working hours (conditional on positive hours) 
Group  Pre tax reform  Post tax reform  Difference  
Difference in 
Difference 
1509 1538  29    Control 
(27) (30) (40)   
1455 1522  67  38  Treatment 
(30) (30) (42) (58) 
 
Notes:  
1.  *** difference or difference-in-difference significantly different from zero at less 
than a 1% significance level (for a two tail test); **   5% significance level; * 10% 
significance level 
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Table 4: Labor Force Participation Probit  
(Regression-adjusted Difference-in-Difference) 
Variable   Coef.  Std. Err. 
Post-reform      -0.023  (0.070) 
Treatment Group (Higher income husbands)  -0.467***  (0.068) 
Post-reform x Treatment Group (Tax Reform effect)    0.281***  (0.097) 
Age       0.035*  (0.020) 
Age squared   -0.001**  (0.000) 
one pre-school child       -0.382***  (0.063) 
two pre-school children   -0.798***  (0.075) 
Education     
   grade 9-10   0.400***  (0.096) 
   grade 11-13,  not high school graduate   0.740***  (0.104) 
   grade 11-13, high school graduate   0.762***  (0.089) 
Obs  3212  
 
Notes:  
1.  Additional covariates: province dummies. 
2.  *** difference or difference-in-difference significantly different from zero at less 
than a 1% significance level (for a two tail test); **   5% significance level; * 10% 
significance level 
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Table 5:  Labor Force Participation:   
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
Estimate 
























1.  The two measures of the average treatment effect on the treated are average 
changes in probability (marginal effects) based on the Probit model reported in 
Table 3. ATET1 is the average treatment effect on the treated given that the 
difference-in-difference assumption (common trends) holds for probabilities. 
ATET2 is the average treatment effect on the treated given that the difference-in- 
difference assumption holds for the latent index. See Blundell et al. (2004)   
2.  Standard errors and significance tests based on 999 bootstrap replications.  
3.  *** significantly different from zero at less than a 1% significance level (for a 
two tail test); **   5% significance level; * 10% significance level 
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Table 6.1: Robustness Tests, Labor Force Participation, 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
   ATET1 ATET2 
0.072*
  0.073*
  Only high school graduates 
(0.039)  (0.045) 
0.078**
  0.083*
  Only middle years of data  
(1987  versus 1990) 
(0.042)  (0.047) 
0.091***
  0.092***
  Alternative treatment group  
(husband’s income  81
st -95
th  percentile) 
(0.030)  (0.033) 
 
Table 6.2: Placebo Tests, Labor Force Participation,  
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
  ATET1 ATET2 
0.017 0.004 
Pre- reform  86 versus 87 
(0.040)  (0.043) 
0.018 0.022 
Post- reform  90 versus 91 
(0.047)  (0.050) 
 
Notes to Tables 6.1 and 6.2: 
1.  The two measures of the average treatment effect on the treated are average changes 
in probability (marginal effects) based on Probit model estimtes. ATET1 is the 
average treatment effect on the treated given that the difference-in-difference 
assumption (common trends) holds for probabilities. ATET2 is the average treatment 
effect on the treated given that the difference-in- difference assumption holds for the 
latent index. 
2.  Standard errors and significance tests based on 999 bootstrap replications.  
3.  *** significantly different from zero at less than a 1% significance level (for a two 
tail test); **   5% significance level; * 10% significance level    
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Table 7: Working Weeks in the Reference Year,  
Selection Corrected Regression 
Variables   Coef.  Std. Err. 
Post-reform   1.01  (0.73) 
Treatment Group (Higher income husbands)  -2.88  (2.78) 
Post-reform x Treatment Group (Tax Reform effect)    1.93  (1.95) 
Age   0.05  (0.31) 
Age squared   0.00  (0.01) 
one pre-school child   -2.16  (2.11) 
two pre-school children   -4.58  (4.68) 
Education     
   grade 9-10  1.81  (2.92) 
   grade 11-13,  not high school graduate  1.27  (4.75) 
   grade 11-13, high school graduate  4.16  (4.81) 
Inverse Mills Ratio  6.25     (11.51) 
Constant  40.14***  (10.52) 
Obs  2176  
 
Notes 
1.  Additional covariates: province dummies. 
2.  *** significantly different from zero at less than a 1% significance level (for a 
two tail test); **   5% significance level; * 10% significance level 
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Table 8:  Annual Total Working Hours,  
Selection Corrected Regression 
Variable   Coef.  Std. Err. 
Post-reform  15.8  (40.4) 
Treatment Group (Higher income husbands)  -303.1**  (145.5) 
Post-reform x Treatment Group (Tax Reform effect)      174.7*  (102.3) 
Age  6.3  (17.2) 
Age squared        -0.2  (0.3) 
one pre-school child     -366.1***  (112.2) 
two pre-school children     -648.5***  (246.8) 
Education     
   grade 9-10     219.2  (165.6) 
   grade 11-13,  not high school graduate     317.2  (261.5) 
   grade 11-13, high school graduate  457.3*  (264.5) 
Inverse Mills Ratio      949.0  (609.4 
Constant   1077.7*  (575.4) 
Obs   2176   
 
Notes  
1.  Additional covariates: province dummies. 
2.  *** significantly different from zero at less than a 1% significance level (for a 
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